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As of this writing, Iraqi political authorities are (1) barring some US citizens who are members of United 
Nations (UN) inspection teams from Iraq, (2) ordering others to leave, (3) inducing some inspection 
teams with US citizens to stop activity, and (4) threatening to shoot down US reconnaissance aircraft 
supporting the inspection teams. These actions have commonly been described by political 
commentators as a blunder, as a miscalculation by Saddam Hussein. These commentators write that just 
when a majority of the UN Security Council’s permanent members--Russia, France, and China--were 
drastically reducing any of their support or acquiescence still remaining for UN sanctions against Iraq, 
the Iraqi threats have now increased this support in a failed effort to separate the US from its allies on 
policy towards Iraq. (The commentators write that the Iraqi threats were intended to further decrease 
support and acquiescence of these countries for sanctions after their refusal to go along with new 
sanctions advanced by the US and the United Kingdom.) 
 
Perhaps. However, a political psychological analysis of events can suggest a a different picture. Let’s say 
that Iraqi officials desire to protect as much of their proscribed military assets--nuclear, chemical, 
biological, missilery--as possible--also as much of their procedures for further developing these assets. 
The force, threats, and lies already employed by these officials have hindered UN inspection efforts, but 
these efforts have still continued with the relentlessness of, first, Rolf Ekeus and now Richard Butler. By 
creating a new crisis, the Iraqis have in effect created a psychological anchoring phenomenon. Suddenly, 
the rigor of inspections is less important than the very constitution of inspection teams. If inspection 
rigor were a “10” on a scale of crisis, team constitution is now a “15.” By seeming to give in on team 
constitution, the Iraqis may induce through psychological anchoring an implicit or unconscious partial 
relenting on inspection rigor. The degree of inspection rigor just may no longer seem to be quite the 
Issue it once was. The political possibility of increasing sanctions on Iraq may be even less possible. (And 
the Iraqis have a case to demand the removal of certain UN team members. After all, Laurent Kabila has 
been able to induce the UN Secretary General to remove two head inspectors of UN teams in the former 
Zaire.) 
 
Some commentators may hypothesize that any positive effects of anchoring come at the expense of 
increasing cohesion of Security Council members reacting to the Iraqi threats. This is a reasonable 
objection. However, in this case the governments of Russia, France, and China desire that sanctions 
against Iraq be abolished as soon as is politic to facilitate oil deals, payment of loans, and other 
economic activities. Social cohesion is a best seeming in this case. Moreover, with changes in time 
perception posited in a previous IBPP article, it is more difficult to sustain motivation to support 
sanctions in an era of globalization--and easier to feel that enough is enough. And, of course, once 
inspections lose their rigor and then cease to exist, it will be more difficult to “catch” Iraq in the future. 
In essence, Iraqi officials through “stress inoculation” have learned how to more covertly, clandestinely, 
and unobtrusively get what they need to continue rebuilding military assets proscribed by the UN. 
 
Another psychological perspective is that of an avoidance-avoidance conflict. Iraqi authorities may well 
have concluded that the US Government intends to do everything it can to maintain sanctions until 
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Saddam is no longer in power. The choice then becomes to suffer sanctions and inspections or to suffer 
sanctions without inspections. Iraqi authorities risk massive retaliation by US forces --resulting in the 
destruction of the present government--but probably believe such retaliation will not occur. 
 
So there may be a miscalculation concerning threats against the US, but it is the commentators who 
miscalculate. The Iraqis may have it just about right. (See Czaczkes, B., & Ganzach, Y. (1996). The natural 
selection of predictive heuristics: Anchoring and adjustment versus representativeness. Journal of 
Behavioral Decisionmaking, 9, 125-139; Diplomacy and force on Iraq. (November 4, 1997.) The New York 
Times, p. A22; Erlanger, S. (November 5, 1997). Analysis: Latest Iraqi crisis tests resolve of Persian Gulf 
allies. The New York Times, http://www.nytimes.com; Globalization and time perception: Are 
multilateral sanctions on the way out? IBPP, 3(14); Mumma, G. H., & Wilson, S. B. Procedural debiasing 
of primacy/anchoring effects in clinical-like judgments. Journal of Clinical Psychology, 51, 841-853.) 
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